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Abstract: This paper seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of 
experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. 
Cognitive penetration occurs when one’s beliefs or desires affect one’s 
perceptual experience in a particular way. I examine two different models of 
cognitive penetration and four different accounts of the distinction between 
conceptual and nonconceptual content. I argue that one model of cognitive 
penetration—“classic” cognitive penetration—is compatible with only one of 
the accounts of nonconceptual content that I identify. I then consider the other 
model of cognitive penetration—cognitive penetration “lite”. I provide reasons 
to think that this is compatible with three accounts of nonconceptual content. 
Moreover, I argue that the account of nonconceptual content that it is not 
compatible with is a spurious notion of nonconceptual content that ought to be 
abandoned. Thus, I claim that cognitive penetration lite is compatible with all 
reasonable specifications of nonconceptual content. 
 
 
In recent work, I have argued that perceptual experience can be penetrated 
by cognitive states, such as beliefs and desires (Macpherson 2012). I did so 
in two ways. One was by claiming that the best explanation of some colour 
experiments was that cognitive penetration was occurring. The second was by 
proposing a mechanism that could explain how at least some instances of 
cognitive penetration might occur: beliefs and desires generate perceptual 
imagery which adds to, contributes to, or alters perceptual experience. The 
mechanism allows one to explain how cognition could affect perception whilst 
making reference only to psychological phenomena, the existence of which is 
supported by good independent evidence. In addition to providing a further 
reason to believe in the existence of cognitive penetration, a second 
motivation for proposing the mechanism, which unlike the first I did not 
articulate in that paper, is that it allows one to endorse the existence of 
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cognitive penetration while retaining a view of perceptual experience that has 
many attractive features. One of these is that experience has nonconceptual 
content, and this feature is the focus of this paper. 
While some have argued that perceptual experience can be 
nonconceptual only if it is not cognitively penetrated (Raftopoulos and Müller 
2006 and Raftopoulos 2009), I disagree. This paper consists in making good 
the claim that the occurrence of cognitive penetration by means of the 
interaction of perceptual imagery and perceptual experience is compatible 
with experience having nonconceptual content. In so doing, I will explain that 
mechanism and also examine more generally the relationship between 
cognitive penetration and nonconceptual content. I distinguish between 
“classic” cognitive penetration and cognitive penetration “lite”. I argue that all 
forms of cognitive penetration lite are compatible with all reasonable 
specifications of nonconceptual content, while classic cognitive penetration is 
compatible with only one specification of nonconceptual content. 
In section one, I introduce the notion of the content of experience and I 
cite the reasons that have motivated people to think that a nonconceptual 
view of the content of experience is plausible. I clarify and refine the claim that 
cognitive penetration and nonconceptual content are compatible in order to 
set aside a trivial sense in which they are compatible. In section two, I outline 
the cognitive penetration claim that I am discussing, which is one about 
perceptual experience, and distinguish it from one that can be made about 
brain mechanisms, in particular, the early visual system. In section three, I 
explain one model of cognitive penetration—the classic model—and consider 
whether it is compatible with four different notions of nonconceptual content. I 
argue that classic cognitive penetration is compatible with one, but only one, 
of these notions of nonconceptual content. Thus if one thought that the only 
kind of cognitive penetration was classic cognitive penetration then it would be 
tempting to think that at least in the core senses of nonconceptual content, 
cognitive penetration and nonconceptual content were incompatible. In 
section four, however, I outline the other model of cognitive penetration—
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cognitive penetration lite. I explain the reasons for thinking that there could be 
such a form. One reason derives from consideration of particular examples of 
cognitive penetration. Another reason stems from consideration of one 
mechanism that would explain some cases of cognitive penetration. I 
consider, in section five, whether cognitive penetration lite is compatible with 
the four accounts of nonconceptual content elucidated in section three. I show 
that it is straightforwardly incompatible with the first account of nonconceptual 
content, but compatible with the third and fourth accounts of nonconceptual 
content. The third account is, I believe, the standard and most influential 
account of nonconceptual content. I argue further that there is a crucial 
ambiguity in the second account of nonconceptual content on which the 
question of the compatibility of cognitive penetration lite with that account of 
nonconceptual content turns. I argue that disambiguated one way there is 
compatibility. Disambiguated another way, that account becomes almost 
equivalent to the first account of nonconceptual content. That is the account of 
nonconceptual content that is not compatible with cognitive penetration lite. 
However, I provide reasons to think that that specification of nonconceptual 
content is spurious and ought to be abandoned. Thus, I argue that cognitive 
penetration lite is compatible with all three reasonable specifications of 
nonconceptual content. 
 
1. Setting the Scene: Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content 
Propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, occurrent thoughts, and 
judgments, represent, or are about, the world. Another way of saying this is 
that they are states that have content, and the content is what is represented 
by the state. For example, if Morag believes that Partick Thistle are the best 
team in Glasgow then her belief represents that Partick Thistle are the best 
team in Glasgow, and one can say that the content of her belief is that Partick 
Thistle are the best team in Glasgow. Propositional attitudes are attitudes, 
such as holding true (in the case of belief) or wanting to be true (in the case of 
desire), that we take towards propositions. Different views hold that the 
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proposition either is, or expresses, the content of the propositional attitude. 
There are many options as to what one should take the content of a 
propositional attitude to be: a proposition or proposition-like entity composed 
of concepts; a proposition or proposition-like entity composed of objects, 
properties and relations; the objects, properties, and relations, or the state of 
affairs specified by the relevant proposition; or the set of possible worlds in 
which the relevant proposition is true; or something else. 
Are perceptual experiences representational states that have content? 
This is a difficult question to answer. Many people think that they are 
(although some think that they involve a more direct relation to the world—one 
of acquaintance or presentation). One oft cited reason for thinking that they 
are representational states is that when having a perceptual experience the 
world seems a certain way to one.2 For example, it may seem to one as if a 
black pentagon is in front of one. And the way it seems would be the way that 
the world is represented to one as being. Another reason often given for 
thinking that perceptual experiences have content is that they have accuracy 
conditions.3 The idea is that one can always assess a perceptual experience 
for accuracy with respect to the actual world. That one can, suggests that one 
can identify the circumstances in which the experience is, or would be, 
accurate (there is a black pentagon in front of you), and that those 
circumstances are to be identified with what the experience represents. 
There is debate about whether the reasons set out above for thinking 
that experiences have content are sufficient. Some people think they are not, 
for they think that the fact that a state can be associated non-arbitrarily with a 
proposition does not show that the state has content. Such people wish to 
impose stricter conditions on what it is for a state to have content. What 
further conditions should be imposed, and whether experience meets them, is 
a matter for debate, discussion of which would take me too far from my 
present purposes. I will simply assume that perceptual experiences represent 
                                                
2 See, for example, Byrne (2001). 
3 See, for example, Siegel (2010) 
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and have content. Doing so will have no effect on the debate that follows. That 
debate is whether, on the assumptions that experiences have content and 
that some experiences have some nonconceptual content, nonconceptual 
content is compatible with experience being cognitively penetrated. 
As in the case of propositional attitude representation, there are 
different options as to what one can think the content of a perceptual 
experience as of a black pentagon is: a proposition or proposition-like entity 
that represents a black pentagon (that may or may not be composed of 
concepts); a black pentagon located in space in front of one; or the set of all 
worlds in which there is a black pentagon in front of one; or something else. 
What is it for content to be conceptual and what is it for it to be 
nonconceptual? It is difficult to give a pithy answer to this question as there 
are different notions of what is required—notions that I will articulate at length 
in section three. However, there are two claims that are common to all 
notions. The first is, as Bermúdez and Cahen (2012) state, that the notion of 
nonconceptual content is contrastive—it is elucidated by distinguishing it from 
some particular conception of conceptual content. The second is that some 
important aspect of explaining how states with nonconceptual content 
represent the world can be done without postulating a crucial role for 
concepts. 
A common conception of conceptual content is that it is the kind of 
content that the propositional attitudes have. One reason for thinking this is 
that a crucial role is postulated for concepts in the having of propositional 
attitudes: in order for a subject to believe or desire something, he or she 
needs to possess the concepts that are required to specify what it is that is 
believed or desired. For example, in order to believe or desire that Partick 
Thistle will be promoted this year, Morag has to possess the concepts of 
Partick Thistle, of promotion, of this year, and of being. What exactly it is to 
possess a concept is one of the most difficult issues to address in philosophy. 
Many different answers have been given and contested. A review of these 
would take me too far from my present purposes, but roughly speaking, she 
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has to be able to think of these things, know what these things are in some 
sense, or have an idea of them. (Those people who hold that the content of 
propositional attitudes is a proposition composed of concepts will have a 
further reason to think that there is a crucial role for concepts in the having of 
a propositional attitude.) 
Because it is fundamentally contrastive, the notion of nonconceptual 
content, which is often attributed to perceptual experiences but also to 
subpersonal states, is often introduced by contrasting it with the content of the 
propositional attitudes. 
Nonconceptual theorists hold that experience has either just 
nonconceptual content or both conceptual and nonconceptual content. If 
experience has both conceptual and nonconceptual content, and only the 
conceptual content is affected by cognition then, in a trivial sense, cognitive 
penetration is compatible with nonconceptual content—but that is an 
uninteresting sense only. What I am interested in, by contrast, is best 
expressed by the following two questions: 
i On the assumption that experiences only have nonconceptual content, can 
experiences be penetrated by cognitive states, such as beliefs and 
desires? 
ii On the assumption that experiences have both conceptual and 
nonconceptual content, can experiences be penetrated by cognitive states, 
such as beliefs and desires, so that they have different nonconceptual 
content from that which they would have had if unpenetrated? 
In the rest of this paper, when I speak of “the question of whether cognitive 
penetration is compatible with nonconceptual content” I will mean to address 
jointly questions i and ii. 
Why is this question interesting? The view that experience has 
nonconceptual content is an attractive view of the nature of perceptual 
experience. This is because there is some reason to think that it provides 
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good explanations of many features that it is plausible to believe perceptual 
experiences have. If one accepts that cognitive penetration occurs and one 
then finds out that it is not compatible with nonconceptual content, then one 
would have to reject the idea of nonconceptual content and find a better 
explanation of the features of experience that motivate its postulation. Thus it 
is an empirical adequacy constraint on a view of the content of experience 
that it is compatible with cognitive penetration. Showing that the views are 
compatible allows one to endorse the attractive nonconceptual view of the 
nature of perceptual content. 
One might worry that this motivation does not carry much weight, for as 
I showed above, there is a trivial sense in which cognitive penetration and 
nonconceptual content are compatible: nonconceptual content exists but it is 
unaffected by cognitive penetration. However, the examples of cognitive 
penetration that I argued existed in Macpherson (2012) involved contents 
pertaining to fine-grained shades of colour. This is one of the central 
examples of contents that proponents of nonconceptual content wish to hold 
is nonconceptual (as I will explain below). Therefore the motivation for 
thinking that this question is interesting should not be dismissed. 
I list below the features that it has been said that experience has that 
have motivated some to postulate nonconceptual content and briefly indicate 
why one might think that they call for an explanation in terms of 
nonconceptual content. Such a list does not consist in a defense of the claim 
that experience has these features, and the reasons that I cite for thinking that 
nonconceptual content provides a good explanation of them does not consist 
in a defense of the claim that nonconceptual content is the best explanation of 
them. There has been detailed argument about these points in the extant 
literature that I will not rehearse or adjudicate here. In this paper I am simply 
assuming that experience has nonconceptual content, not arguing for it. (I am 
also assuming that there is cognitive penetration—not arguing for it.) In 
addition to bringing the reasons that one might have for holding that 
experience has nonconceptual content to the reader’s attention, another 
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reason for listing them is to be in a better position, later in the paper, to 
address the question of whether cognitive penetration is consistent with 
experience having nonconceptual content. 
To this end, here are six alleged features of experience that have 
motivated people to hold that experiences have nonconceptual content: 
I. Experiences can be, and often are, very fine-grained. Some people hold 
that such experiences are more fine-grained than our conceptual 
capacities. For example, we can see and experience millions of different 
shades of colours. We do not typically possess names for each of these 
shades. But even if we assigned names to each of the shades, we would 
be unable to attach the labels to the shades at a later time later by means 
of just looking at them using only our memory—at least if more than a few 
seconds have passed. Thus, after seeing or experiencing specific shades 
of colour, we cannot keep them in mind for more than a few seconds. So 
one might hold that we do not have concepts of each of the specific 
shades of colour that we can see and experience, except when seeing or 
experiencing them, or just seconds afterwards. I may of course keep in 
mind the names of some of these shades—such as “burnt umber”—or 
descriptions of these shades—such as “the shade of colour of your sofa”. 
But as we cannot pick out the shades of colour that these refer to at a 
later time, there is reason to think that we do not fully have in mind 
concepts of these colours in the way that we do when we are 
experiencing the shade. Thus, one might think that experiences can 
represent in more detail than my concepts—or at least the concepts that I 
have when not seeing or perceiving. Perhaps when seeing and 
experiencing, I can come to have concepts as fine-grained as my 
experience, but these inherit their content from those experiences, and 
they disappear seconds after the experiences disappear. (These 
considerations do not apply to categories of shades of colour. We do 
possess words for and concepts of red, blue, green, pink, orange, and so 
on, and can attach these labels appropriately to shades that we see or 
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experience.) This fineness of grain of experience with respect to shades 
of colour applies to many other properties, such as pitches and volumes 
of sound and the size and shape of things.4  
II. Experiences represent in a unit-free manner. Peacocke (1986) brings 
attention to the fact that when our experience represents the size of 
objects, say the length of the table in front of me, it does not represent its 
length in feet or centimetres, or any other unit. Likewise, when my 
experience represents how loud a sound is, or how cold the room is, the 
quantity is not given in any particular units of measurement. He argues 
that conceptual representation cannot represent in this fashion. 
III. Experiential representation is analogue nature. Dretske (1981) claims that 
conceptual representation is digital and chunks together information, in 
the way that a digital watch chunks together units of time into seconds or 
minutes and represents which second or minute it is but not when within 
that second or minute time-frame the present lies. In contrast, an 
analogue watch, with its constantly moving hands not only represents 
seconds and minutes, but when within those units the present lies. The 
position of the hand varies as the time does. Unlike discrete, digital, 
conceptual representation, Dretske claims that our experiences of 
properties like colour, length, temperature, pitch and volume are all 
continuous and analogue in nature, and hence he claims, nonconceptual. 
The claim that experience is analogue is not the same as the claim that it 
is fine-grained. Experience could be fine-grained while still being digital, 
by having lots and lots of digital categories. For example, a digital watch 
that included a digital count of the seconds passing would be fine-grained 
compared to one that only included a digital count of the minutes, but 
neither would be the same as an analogue clock. 
IV. Perceptual experiences that represent the world can be had by young 
children and animals. It is common to think that young children and 
                                                
4 This consideration has been discussed by, among others Evans (1982), Raffman 
(1995), Peacocke (1992), Tye (2006) and MacDowell (1996). 
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animals do not possess concepts. If that is true then, if they can have 
experiences that represent the world, those experiences cannot have 
conceptual content.5 
V. Plausibly, it is in virtue of having perceptual experiences that we acquire 
perceptual concepts, such as ones of shape, size, colour, pitch, heat, sour 
and malodourous. If we acquire such concepts through experience then 
one might hold that experience must represent these features prior to our 
possessing the concepts required to canonically describe the content of 
the experience, and hence that there must be nonconceptual content. 
VI. The content of experience can represent contradictions. Plausibly, we can 
experience contradictions when having visual experiences as of 
impossible tri-bars and other impossible figures made and drawn by 
artists.6 One might hold that propositional attitudes with conceptual 
content cannot have contradictory content and thus that the content of 
perceptual experience must be nonconceptual. However, one might think 
that this idea needs refining, for it is not obvious that states with 
conceptual content cannot be contradictory. For example one can 
entertain the thought with conceptual content that P and not P, which 
represents a contradiction. One therefore might instead claim that one 
cannot be in a state with contradictory conceptual content when the 
attitude of that state asserts that the world is a certain way, as belief does, 
but which the mere entertaining of a thought, and other propositional 
attitudes, do not. Then one could claim that perceptual experiences assert 
that the world is a certain way, and that unlike belief they can represent 
the world to be contradictory. Thus one could argue that the content of 
perceptual experiences must be nonconceptual. Further, in light of 
dialethiests’ apparent beliefs that there can be true contradictions, one 
might wish to further refine the thesis to be that one cannot rationally be in 
                                                
5 For further discussion see Bermúdez (1998) and Peacocke (2001). 
6 See Crane (1992) and Macpherson (2010). Crane also claims that one has such a 
contradictory experience when undergoing the waterfall illusion, also known as the 
motion after effect. It is far from clear, however, that one does undergo such an 
experience in that case. 
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a conceptual state that asserts that the world is a certain way, and 
represent it as containing true contradictions, but one can rationally have 
a perceptual experience that asserts that the world is a certain way, and 
represents it as containing true contradictions.7 
Thus far, I have introduced the notion of content and of conceptual and 
nonconceptual content. I have listed six alleged features of perceptual 
experience that have motivated people to hold that perceptual experience has 
nonconceptual content. I have explained that the key question that will be 
addressed in this paper is whether cognitive penetration is compatible with 
nonconceptual content and why one should be interested in this question. 
 
2. Cognitive Penetration 
In this section, I address the question of what cognitive penetration is. I outline 
two cognitive penetration claims—one about brain mechanisms and one 
about perceptual experience. It is the claim about perceptual experience that 
is the focus of this paper. 
 There have been two forms of the claim that perception is cognitively 
penetrated. One form of the claim is about brain mechanisms, and has been 
discussed almost exclusively with respect to vision, to which I will also limit my 
discussion in this paper. The claim is that early vision can be cognitively 
penetrated for “the function it computes is sensitive, in a semantically 
coherent way, to the organism’s goals and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in 
a way that bears some logical relation to what the person knows” (Pylyshyn 
1999: 343). The early visual system is defined functionally, as a system that 
takes attentionally modulated signals from the eyes (and perhaps some 
information from other sensory modalities) as inputs, and produces shape, 
size and colour representations—representations of visual properties—as 
output. These basic representations are then processed further and at some 
                                                
7 Dialethiesm was developed by Priest (1987), who would of course resist the thought 
that the view is irrational. 
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point may be categorised and identified, drawing on a person’s memory and 
knowledge, as being objects and properties of particular kinds. 
Higher-level cognitive states can affect the position of one’s eyes and 
what one attends to, and that will of course usually have an effect on what 
processing takes place in early vision. For example, my desire to look to the 
left caused by my belief that there is an interesting insect there, may cause 
me to move my eyes and focus my attention in a way that alters which input 
the early visual system receives and hence which processing takes place in it. 
But according to many that discuss this thesis, such as Pylyshyn (1999), 
those instances do not count as instances of penetration. This is because 
attention and eye movements are said to affect that which feeds into the early 
visual system, not the early visual system itself. Whether one should rule out 
these effects as instances of cognitive penetration is a matter of debate. 
Likewise, whether the constraints of semantic coherence and logical relations 
between that which does the penetrating and that which is penetrated should 
be a requirement for the existence of cognitive penetration is also a matter 
that is disputed. 
The second form of the claim about cognitive penetration concerns 
perceptual experience, not early visual processing. This is the claim that 
philosophers have tended to be interested in. (Psychologists have been 
mostly interested in the claim about early visual processing, although this is 
starting to change and they are becoming increasingly interested in this 
second claim about experience.) Broadly, the claim is that, with certain 
conditions fixed, namely, what is perceived, the perceiving conditions, and the 
state of the sensory organ, it is possible for two subjects (or one subject at 
different times) to have different perceptual experiences on account of the 
differing content of the states of their cognitive systems. States of the 
cognitive system will include the having of propositional attitudes, such as 
beliefs and desires, the having of occurrent thoughts and judgements, the 
having of certain concepts, and the state of having certain concepts primed so 
that they are more likely to be used in the formation of propositional attitudes, 
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occurrent thoughts and judgments. Two experiences will count as different in 
this context if they have different representational contents—which, one might 
plausibly hold, in all or many cases will go hand in hand with having different 
phenomenal characters, as I will assume in this paper.8 
I said that this was “broadly” the claim because one can debate, as one 
can in the case of the cognitive penetration claim regarding brain 
mechanisms, whether one should exclude the effects of attention as counting 
as instances of cognitive penetration. Likewise, one can discuss whether one 
ought to insist on a semantic or logical connection between the content of the 
state that penetrates and the perceptual experience—or indeed some 
stronger connection between the content of these states.9 Discussion of these 
two points, interesting though they are, lies outside the scope of this paper. 
Deciding them one way or another is not relevant to my concerns. 
                                                
8 The claim that there can be differences in the content of experience without a 
difference in the phenomenal character of experience or vice versa is a claim that 
strong representationalists would deny. Whether they are right, and on what grounds, 
is a subject that has been discussed at length by many. I will assume it for 
convenience here, although I have argued elsewhere that the claim, in some forms, 
is not true. See Macpherson (2003, 2005 and 2006). 
9 For example, some people might think that there are cases that do not count as 
cases of cognitive penetration, even though the cases are ones in which a cognitive 
state causes a particular perceptual experience to occur and there is a semantic or 
logical connection between the content of a cognitive state and the content of the 
perceptual experience. They might deny that they are cases of cognitive penetration 
because they think that the semantic or logical connection between the states exists 
merely by accident. For example, suppose that Murdo believes that aliens are 
attacking Earth. This belief causes stress, which induces a migraine. Suppose that 
whenever Murdo has a migraine, he experiences flashing lights in the top half of his 
visual field. So suppose that Murdo visually experiences flashing lights in the sky on 
account of having his migrane. The content of this experience bears a semantic 
relation to the belief that caused it—the belief about the alien attack—but one might 
want to deny that this is a case of cognitive penetration. This is because it seems to 
be by chance that the nature of Murdo’s migraines are such that they produce 
experiences of flashing lights, and that that content bears a semantic relation to the 
belief that induced the migraine. In light of this kind of case, someone might want to 
claim that, in addition to a semantic relation between the content of the cognitive 
state and the perception, the intermediate state that does the penetrating—in the 
example just given, the migraine state—has to have the content that it does because 
the cognitive state that causes it has the content that it has. Or they might insist that 
there has to be a direct transfer of content from the cognitive state without going 
through any intermediate state into the perceptual state. Working out clear versions 
of these stronger claims that one might wish to stipulate lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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That these two cognitive penetration claims—one about brain 
mechanisms and one about perceptual experience—should be distinguished 
is sometimes given lip service, but often not adhered to. For example, when 
discussing the claim about brain mechanisms, Pylyshyn (1999) explicitly 
claims that he is not discussing a claim about perceptual experience and that 
one should not think of the early visual system as determining the nature of 
visual experience. Yet, he adduces evidence about whether experience is 
penetrated in defence of his position. 
The claim that I am considering in this paper, and will refer to as “the 
cognitive penetration claim”, is the claim that (at least some) perceptual 
experiences are cognitively penetrated. Drawing on what has been said in this 
section and the previous one, the claim is that with certain conditions fixed, 
namely, what is perceived, the perceiving conditions, the state of the sensory 
organ, (and perhaps the attentional focus of the subject), it is possible for two 
subjects (or one subject at different times) to have perceptual experiences 
with different contents, on account of the differing content of the states of their 
cognitive systems. (Whether one should add, “in virtue of the content of the 
cognitive system having semantic, rational, or logical connections to the 
content of the perceptual experience”, I will leave for the reader’s decision.) 
I am not going to argue that the cognitive penetration claim is true in 
this paper. I am only going to consider the question of whether cognitive 
penetration is compatible with nonconceptual content. 
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3. Is Classic Cognitive Penetration Compatible with Nonconceptual 
Content? 
In this section, I outline one model of cognitive penetration that I call “classic” 
cognitive penetration.10 On this model, the following takes place in a case of 
cognitive penetration: 
(a) You have a certain propositional attitude that p (for example, you believe 
that computers look like grey boxes). 
(b) p involves a concept C (for example, the concept of being a computer), in 
the sense that C is required to specify the content that p and possession 
of C is required in order to have the propositional attitude that p. 
(c) The content of this propositional attitude causally affects your perceptual 
processes yielding an experience with the content that q (for example, an 
experience with the content that there is a computer present) that involves 
C (in the sense that C is required to specify the content that q). 
(d) The content that q is a content that an experience could not have unless it 
was affected by propositional attitudes in this way. 
Classic penetration occurs when each of the conditions (a) – (d) occurs. It 
follows that, when classic penetration occurs, you could not have an 
experience with the content that q, unless you possessed the concept C. 
The question I will now address is whether classic cognitive penetration 
is compatible with nonconceptual content in the sense that I outlined in 
section one. 
There are different accounts of what nonconceptual content is, and 
hence of the difference between nonconceptual and conceptual content. I 
identify four different accounts, which I believe are exhaustive of the accounts 
                                                
10 The classic model of cognitive penetration should not be confused with the classic 
view of perception. The classic view of perception is that cognitive penetration does 
not occur. The classic model of cognitive penetration is one model of what occurs 
when cognitive penetration occurs. 
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that are found in the literature. I specify each account and, in turn, discuss 
whether that notion of nonconceptual content is compatible with classic 
cognitive penetration. 
 The accounts of nonconceptual content detailed below specify what it 
is for a state to have nonconceptual content, on the assumption that it has 
content. In other words, these accounts do not specify what it is for a state to 
have content in the first place. They only specify what it takes for a state that 
has content to count as having nonconceptual content. When considering 
accounts of conceptual and nonconceptual content below, I will not specify 
each time the caveat “on the assumption that the state has content”, but one 
should take it to be in place each time. 
The first account of nonconceptual content is that “the existence of 
cognitively impenetrable mechanisms is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for nonconceptual content” (Raftopoulos and Müller, 2006: 190)11. The idea is 
that if a state or an experience that has content is produced by a system that 
cannot be cognitively penetrated then that state or experience has 
nonconceptual content. If a state or an experience that has content is 
produced by a system that can be cognitively penetrated then that state or 
experience has conceptual content. 
Raftopoulos and Müller (2006) and Raftopoulos (2009) hold that early 
vision is a cognitively impenetrable system or mechanism and that some 
states of early vision can be identified with (at least some) visual experiences. 
They therefore believe that (at least some) perceptual experiences are not 
cognitively penetrated. Thus they maintain that those perceptual experiences 
have nonconceptual content. 
Raftopoulos and Müller are clear examples of people who believe, tout 
court, that if perceptual experience is cognitively penetrated then its content 
cannot be nonconceptual and must be conceptual. Classic cognitive 
penetration is clearly not compatible with this notion of nonconceptual content. 
                                                
11 See also Raftopoulos (2009) for affirmation of the same account. 
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Nonconceptual content is simply defined as that which is produced by a 
cognitively impenetrable mechanism. 
It should be noted that this conception of nonconceptual content is 
nonstandard. When the other notions of nonconceptual content are outlined, 
this conception of nonconceptual content will clearly stand out as being rather 
different from the rest, which are more similar to each other. One might 
wonder why this definition of nonconceptual content has been adopted by 
Raftopoulos and Müller. I believe that I have an answer to this question, which 
can be gleaned by considering in detail the other accounts of nonconceptual 
content. Once I have done so, I will return to answer this question in section 
five. 
The second account of nonconceptual content is one articulated by 
Bermúdez and Cahen (2011). They begin by claiming that the view that the 
contents of propositional attitudes and the contents of perceptual experiences 
are conceptual is motivated by the conjunction of two thoughts: 
1) In specifying what a thinker believes, what a perceiver perceives or what a 
speaker is saying by uttering a certain sentence in a particular context one 
has to be as faithful as possible to how that thinker, perceiver or speaker 
apprehends the world. 
2) How a thinker, perceiver or speaker apprehends the world in having beliefs 
about it, perceiving it or speaking about it is a function of the concepts he 
possesses. 
They claim that nonconceptual theorists reject the second thought. Thus, they 
define nonconceptual content as being content that is not a function of the 
concepts possessed by the subject of the state that has that content. 
Much the same idea was mooted in earlier work by Bermúdez (1999: 367) 
who claims: 
A creature has perceptions with conceptual contents … to the extent that its 
perceptual representations of the environment are determined by its classificatory 
and recognitional abilities. 
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This yields another way of saying that nonconceptual content is content that is 
independent of the concepts that the subject has: the content is not 
determined by those concepts. I will amalgamate these accounts and speak 
of them, for ease of reference as the Bermúdez and Cahen account. 
 Recall that on the classic model of cognitive penetration, you could not 
have an experience with a certain representational content unless you 
possessed a certain concept. Hence, when classic cognitive penetration 
occurs, the content of experience clearly is a function of, and is determined 
by, the concepts that the subject of the state with that content possesses. 
Therefore the content of a state that is classically penetrated must be 
conceptual according to this second account of the distinction between 
conceptual and nonconceptual content. Classic cognitive penetration is 
therefore clearly also incompatible with this second account of nonconceptual 
content. 
 The third account of nonconceptual content is that an experience has 
nonconceptual content if and only if a subject of an experience with that 
content need not possess the concepts required to specify that content. (The 
experience will have conceptual content otherwise.) This account of 
nonconceptual content is the orthodox account of nonconceptual content. It is 
often called the “state account” of nonconceptual content, and is frequently 
contrasted with the “content account” that we will consider next. (I will also 
sometimes use the terms the “state sense” of conceptual and nonconceptual 
content and the “content sense” of conceptual and nonconceptual content to 
refer to these two accounts of the difference between the types of contents.) 
The state account is discussed by, among others, Evans (1982), Cussins 
(1990), Crane (1992), and Peacocke (1992 and 2001). 
 This account of nonconceptual content specifies a necessary and 
sufficient condition that the subject of an experience must meet in order for his 
or her experience to have nonconceptual content. It is important to note that 
this account of nonconceptual content is modal. Crucially, it does not say that 
an experience has nonconceptual content if and only if a subject does not 
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possess the concepts required to specify the content of the state. Rather, it 
says that an experience has nonconceptual content if and only if the subject 
need not possess those concepts in order to have the experience. So the 
subject may, in fact, possess the concepts required to specify the content of 
the experience. What is vital is that it is possible for the subject to have the 
experience and not possess those concepts. 
Again, recall that on the classic model of cognitive penetration, what 
your experience represents is such that you could not have that experience 
unless you possessed a certain concept. That concept is one that is required 
to specify the content of the experience. Thus, on this third account of 
nonconceptual content, when classic cognitive penetration occurs, the content 
of experience will count as being conceptual. Thus, classic cognitive 
penetration and nonconceptual content, conceived of as per the state 
account, are incompatible. 
Lastly, there is the fourth account of nonconceptual content. While the 
state account laid down conditions that the subject of the state must meet in 
order for the state to be nonconceptual, this “content account” of 
nonconceptual content lays down conditions solely that the content itself must 
meet. According to the content account, an experience has nonconceptual 
content if and only if the content of the state does not have concepts as 
constituents. (The experience will have conceptual content otherwise.) This 
account was articulated and differentiated from the state account by Heck 
(2000). 
In section one, I mentioned what the contents of a state might be taken 
to be. I explained that they could be taken to be various things. Extant 
accounts have, variously, taken them to be (1) propositions composed of 
concepts, or (2) objects and properties, or (3) sets of possible worlds. 
According to the content account of nonconceptual content, if the content of 
experience is what the first of these three suggestions says it is then it is 
conceptual content. The latter two conceptions of content are conceptions of 
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nonconceptual content. That is because only in the second and third cases 
the content is not composed of concepts. 
The state account of nonconceptual content and the content account of 
nonconceptual content are completely independent of each other. The view 
that experience is conceptual in the state sense and the view that experience 
is nonconceptual in the state sense are each compatible with both the view 
that experience is conceptual in the content sense and the view that 
experience is nonconceptual in the content sense. 
If an experience is cognitively penetrated on the classic model, then 
that tells us nothing about what the constituents of the content are. Therefore, 
it is perfectly compatible with experience being classically penetrated that its 
content not be concepts but objects or properties, or sets of possible worlds, 
instead, and hence be nonconceptual content as stipulated by the content 
account. Thus, this fourth conception of nonconceptual content is compatible 
with classic cognitive penetration. 
Despite this independence of the state account of conceptual and 
nonconceptual content and the content account of conceptual and 
nonconceptual content, Bermúdez (2007) argues that a good explanation of 
why experiences have conceptual content in the state sense, that is, a good 
explanation of why there are some experiences that one cannot have unless 
one possesses a certain concept, is that that concept is a constituent of the 
content—in other words that they have conceptual content in the content 
sense. 
 On the basis of this, one might try to argue that as classic cognitive 
penetration is incompatible with the state account of nonconceptual content, 
this provides a good reason to think that it is incompatible with the content 
account of nonconceptual content. One might try to claim that a good 
explanation of what goes on in classic cognitive penetration is that the content 
of a propositional attitude that p, which involves the concept C (in the manner 
specified at the start of this section), interacts with your perceptual processes 
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by making C a constituent of the content of the experience—and thus giving it 
conceptual content according to the content account. 
However, cognitive penetration gives us a reason to think that there is 
another good explanation of why an experience that is classically cognitively 
penetrated cannot have nonconceptual content according to the state 
account: the propositional attitude that p, which involves the concept C, and 
hence requires possession of C, is simply a necessary cause of your having 
the experience. The concept C does not become a constituent of the content, 
but possession of it is necessary in order to have the experience. Thus, we 
need not think that if an experience has conceptual content according to the 
state account, it has to have conceptual content according to the content 
account. 
To summarise, we have seen that three out of four accounts of the 
difference between conceptual and nonconceptual content will count the 
content of an experience that is the result of classic cognitive penetration as 
having conceptual content and not nonconceptual content. The exception was 
the fourth account of nonconceptual content, according to which an 
experience has nonconceptual content if and only if the content of the state 
does not have concepts as constituents. Classic cognitive penetration could 
be (but clearly need not be) nonconceptual in this sense. 
One can appreciate now that if one thought that the only form of 
cognitive penetration was classic cognitive penetration, then one might be 
tempted to think that cognitive penetration, simpliciter, and nonconceptual 
content were incompatible. One might set aside the content account—the 
fourth account—as not as important as the traditional state account of 
nonconceptual content—the third account. (Or one might, as we saw that 
someone akin to Bermúdez might do, argue that a good explanation of the 
incompatibility of classic cognitive penetration with the state account—the 
third account—is that it is incompatible with the content account.) However, as 
we will see, once we have the model of cognitive penetration lite in our 
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purview we should no longer be tempted to hold that cognitive penetration and 
nonconceptual content are incompatible. 
 
4. Cognitive Penetration Lite 
In this section, I articulate another model of cognitive penetration and give 
reasons to think that such a model is plausible. In the next section, I go on to 
consider to what extent experience being penetrated in this manner is 
compatible with its having nonconceptual content. 
 Here is a second model of cognitive penetration: 
(a) You have a certain propositional attitude that p (for example, you believe 
that something red is likely to be found at your present location). 
(b) p involves a concept R (for example, the concept of being red), in the 
sense that possession of R is required to specify the content that p and 
possession of R is required in order to have the propositional attitude that 
p. 
(c) The content of this propositional attitude causally affects your perceptual 
processes yielding an experience with the content that q (for example, 
that there is something red present) that involves R (in the sense that R is 
required to specify the content that q). 
(d) The content that q is a content that an experience could have without 
being affected by propositional attitudes in this way. 
Call this cognitive penetration “lite”. The idea is that there is a form of 
cognitive penetration which is such that, although it causes an experience 
with content q to come about and, on that occasion, the experience with 
content q probably would not have come about unless cognitive penetration 
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had occurred, on other occasions it would be possible to have an experience 
that represented that q without cognitive penetration occurring12. 
 Why should we think that such a form of cognitive penetration is 
possible? One reason comes from thinking about particular examples of 
cognitive penetration, two of which I will discuss below. A second reason 
comes from thinking about the mechanism that might explain some cases of 
cognitive penetration. I will explain each of these in turn. It should be 
remembered that in the discussion of these two reasons, I am not trying to 
establish that cognitive penetration exists. I am assuming cognitive 
penetration exists and considering what forms of it there could be and 
whether they are compatible with nonconceptual content. 
 One example of an alleged case of cognitive penetration, discussed at 
length in Macpherson (2012), occurs in an experiment by Delk and 
Fillenbaum (1965). To summarise the experiment briefly: different shapes 
were cut out of a uniformly coloured orange paper. Some of these shapes 
were shapes of characteristically red objects, such as hearts and lips, and 
some were not. These shapes were placed against a uniformly coloured 
background that could be adjusted in colour from yellow, through the shade of 
the orange of the paper, and into red. Subjects were instructed to ask for 
changes in the colour of the background to be made until it matched the 
colour of the shape placed in front of it. Subjects chose a background that was 
redder when the characteristically red objects were placed in front of it than 
they did when the other objects were placed in front of it. The latter were 
matched to a more orange colour. (The more orange colour was, objectively, 
the more accurate match.) 
                                                
12 I say that the experience with content q probably would not have come about 
unless cognitive penetration had occurred, not simply that it would not have come 
about, because there could be cases of preemption where, although cognitive 
penetration is the cause of an experience with a certain content coming about, the 
cognitive penetration could have preempted another event that would have caused 
the same effect if the cognitive penetration did not occur. I take it that such cases of 
preemption would be rare. In the absence of preempted causes, if the cognitive 
penetration had not occurred then the experience would not have had the content 
that it did. 
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 Suppose that these are cases of cognitive penetration in which 
subjects’ beliefs about the characteristic colour of some of the shapes, or 
some other relevant belief or beliefs, penetrate their experience of those 
shapes so that they see some of them as redder than others. (See 
Macpherson, 2012, for a detailed discussion of whether this case or similar 
cases are cases of cognitive penetration.) Suppose then that when looking at 
the orange heart, subjects’ beliefs that hearts are red penetrate their 
respective experiences and cause them to have experiences as of a red 
heart. It seems clearly possible that that type of experience could have been 
produced by perception alone, such as might occur in a simple, non-
cognitively penetrated veridical experience of a heart that is cut out of red 
paper—an experience as of a red heart.13 In other words, there is reason to 
think that there could be cognitive penetration lite. 
 A second example is discussed by Tye (1995), and concerns 
experiences of the face/vase ambiguous drawing. When one looks at that 
drawing, one can experience it either as two faces looking at each other or as 
a vase. One account of what occurs when looking at the drawing is that one 
either has an experience that represents faces or one has an experience that 
represents a vase. However, some people think that faces and vases cannot 
be represented by visual experience. They think that only low-level properties 
can be represented in visual experience, such as shape, colour, position, 
object-hood, figure, and ground.14 Such people would be inclined to think that 
when looking at the drawing, one can have two different experiences, one of 
which would prompt one to judge that there were faces present, if one 
possessed the concept of faces, and the other of which would prompt one to 
                                                
13 Someone might be tempted to think that such experiences couldn’t be had for they 
might think that a subject’s belief that hearts are red might affect their experience 
when looking at a red heart yielding a non-veridical experience of the colour of the 
heart: perhaps an experience of a deeper shade of red than is present. While that 
could, but need not, be the case for a subject who had the belief that hearts are red, 
it would not be the case for a subject who lacked the belief that hearts were red. And 
it is definitely possible that there could be such a subject. 
14 A summary of the debate about whether high-level properties can be found in 
visual experience or whether only low-level properties can be is found in Macpherson 
(2011). 
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judge that there was a vase present, if one possessed the concept of a vase. 
But they would hold that the difference in what the experiences represented 
would be in the low-level properties. For example, they might claim that, in 
one experience, the portion of the picture corresponding to the faces would be 
represented as figure and the portion corresponding to the vase as ground, 
and in the other experience the reverse would be true. 
 Tye holds this second view. According to him, what determines which 
experience you have could involve top-down processing, such as the priming 
or employment of either the concept faces or the concept vase. However, he 
thinks that you could also have each experience purely in virtue of bottom-up 
processing. In other words, the figure and ground status of parts of the 
drawing could be assigned purely by the visual system with no top-down 
processing occurring. Moreover, this could, but need not, happen in the 
absence of the possession of the concept faces and the concept vase in 
virtue of different assignments of figure and ground. If you lacked the 
concepts you would not go on to judge that what you experienced was faces 
or a vase, but you would be having the same experience that would allow you 
to so judge were you to possess those concepts. 
 Tye’s account of this case invokes the idea of cognitive penetration lite. 
A cognitive state involving the employment of certain concepts can penetrate 
perception to produce a certain experience, but it would be possible to have 
that experience without cognitive penetration occurring, by purely bottom-up 
processing. Thus, if there can be cognitive penetration, it seems that there is 
no reason to think that there could not be cognitive penetration lite. I have not 
argued here that there are any such cases, but simply that one should think 
that such cases are possible if you think that cognitive penetration is possible. 
 Besides consideration of particular cases such as these, another 
reason to think that there can be cognitive penetration lite comes from 
reflection on a mechanism that might explain some cases of cognitive 
penetration. As I stated in the introduction, I have postulated such a 
mechanism in Macpherson (2012). We have reason to believe that each 
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stage of the mechanism could occur, independently of any considerations of 
cognitive penetration. The evidence suggesting the existence of the 
phenomena that constitute each stage of the mechanism, plus the overall 
ability of the mechanism to implement cognitive penetration, forms a reason to 
think that cognitive penetration lite could occur. Let me explain. 
 We know that cognitive states, such as beliefs, thoughts, and desires, 
can cause some states with visual phenomenal character that are not genuine 
perceptions of the world to come into existence. Such states are 
commonplace: 
! Perceptual imagery (both intentional and unbidden) 
! Dreams 
! Hallucinations 
Often, but not always, the content of such states reflect one’s beliefs or 
desires. For example, one might desire to live in a large castle with turrets and 
crow steps and therefore frequently perceptually imagine such a castle. 
Alternatively, one might have visited the Alhambra and so have beliefs about 
what it looks like. In consequence, one might dream about the Alhambra and 
one’s dream may reflect the beliefs that one holds about how it actually looks. 
Similarly, people suffering from hallucinations brought on by Parkinson’s 
disease can hallucinate deceased partners or pets. 15 Such hallucinations 
draw on a subject’s knowledge and beliefs about those people and animals 
and how they looked, and perhaps his or her desire for them to be present. 
 We also know that the phenomenal character of those experiential 
states can interact with and affect the phenomenal character and content of 
an experiential state with perceptual phenomenal character that is involved in 
actually perceiving the world. In fact, in such cases, subjects do not seem to 
be aware of two states – an imaginative, dream or hallucinatory one and a 
perceptual one. So, a more accurate description of what is taking place is that 
the processes that typically do create perceptual imagery, dreams or 
                                                
15 See, for example, Barnes and David (2001). 
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hallucinations interact with the perceptual process to yield one state with 
phenomenal character. The phenomenal character of the state is determined 
by the contribution of both processes: imagery, dreaming or hallucination, on 
the one hand, and perception on the other. 
 We have reasons to think that such interactions do occur. Consider, for 
example, the Perky effect (Perky 1910). Subjects are placed facing a white 
wall and asked to visually imagine a certain object and, unbeknown to them, 
an image that is above conscious visible threshold for normal subjects is 
shone onto the wall. In these conditions, subjects subsequently report that 
they had visual imagery but they deny that they saw anything. However, what 
they report imagining is influenced by the image that is shone onto the wall. A 
standard interpretation of what is going on is that subjects mistook their 
perceptual experience for visual imagery (Thomas 2008). Another 
interpretation is that subjects did not consciously perceive the image shone 
onto the wall because their carrying out the imagery task resulted in the image 
being below conscious visible threshold for the subject (Segal 1971 and Segal 
and Fusella 1971, as reported in Thomas 2008). That is a plausible thought 
because some instances of high cognitive load are known to affect which 
stimuli reach consciousness. (See for example Carmel et al. 2007.) On this 
alternative interpretation, it is claimed the subjects unconsciously perceived 
the image and that influenced what they went on to visually imagine. 
It does not matter for my purposes which of these interpretations is 
right; what is clear is that the resulting experience has aspects that are 
contributed by perceptual processing and aspects that are contributed by the 
imagination. While the image projected on the screen affected what was 
reported, indicating that perceptual processing must have played a part in 
generating the experience, what was imagined affected what was reported 
too. Subjects often reported elements to their experience in addition to those 
present in the image that was projected onto the screen. For example, when 
only the outline shape of a book was projected onto the screen, a subject 
reported imagining a book with writing on it; when only the outline shape of a 
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leaf was projected, a subject reported imagining a leaf with veins on it. And in 
a twist on the experiment (Segal 1971 and Segal and Fusella 1971, cited in 
Thomas 2008), an object unrelated to the object that the subject was 
instructed to visually imagine was projected onto the wall. A tomato was 
projected onto the wall while subjects were instructed to imagine the New 
York Skyline. Subjects reported imaging the New York skyline at sunset. 
Therefore, we know that processes that generate visual imagery under 
voluntary control, hence processes affected by thoughts and beliefs and 
desires, together with perceptual processing, can yield one phenomenal 
experience whose content and phenomenal character are affected by and 
determined by both. 
Similar interactions are known between processes that underlie 
dreaming and perception. For example, some experiences have elements that 
are contributed by both dreaming and perceptual processes, as when real 
world stimuli affect what one dreams about. For example, the sound of a loud 
bang might cause one to dream that an earthquake is occurring. As in the 
Perky case, it does not interest me here whether it is right to say that the 
resultant experience, or elements of it, are really dreamed or perceived or 
both. What is crucial is that what appears to the subject to be one experience 
has elements that are clearly caused by both dreaming and perceptual 
processes. 
Likewise, some experiences are known to be created by both 
hallucinatory and perceptual processes. For example, many actual 
hallucinations are partial hallucinations—and thus unlike the philosophers’ 
favoured example of total hallucinations where everything experienced is 
hallucinatory. In partial hallucinations, objects are visually hallucinated to be in 
a scene that is actually perceived by the subject. For example, during 
Lilliputian hallucinations, very small people are hallucinated and seem to be 
seen in the environment that the subjects otherwise accurately perceive. For 
example, small people might be experienced as on the carpet, or peeking out 
from behind the curtains, or on the subject’s food (Chand and Murthy 2007). 
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These three examples—the Perky effect, the incorporation of 
perceptual elements into dreams, and partial hallucinations—show that states 
with visual phenomenology can be produced that have elements contributed 
by imagination, dreams, or hallucinations on the one hand, and perception on 
the other. Thus, they show how states with visual phenomenology can be 
influenced by cognitive states, for the processes that lead to imagination, 
dreams and hallucinations can be so influenced. The idea is that cognitive 
states cause some imaginative, dream or hallucinatory processes to come 
into existence. These processes interact with the perceptual process to yield 
one state with visual phenomenal character, the content and character of 
which is therefore partly caused by cognitive states. 
It is easy to see why this mechanism could produce cognitive 
penetration lite if we think that hallucinations, dreams and visual imagery can, 
at least on some occasions, have the same phenomenology as visual 
perceptual experiences. For in those instances, the addition of such 
phenomenology to perceptual experiences would produce an experience that 
could have been had by perception alone. So the resultant experience would 
be an example of an experience produced by cognitive penetration lite. 
It seems highly plausible that some hallucinations and dreams have the 
same phenomenology as some visual perceptual experiences. In the case of 
visual imagery, the Perky experiments provide some support for the traditional 
idea that visual imagery is like a form of perception: that had when looking at 
faint, de-saturated, indistinct or blurry things, or when perceptual conditions 
are such as to produce faint, de-saturated, indistinct or blurry experiences of 
things. At least they do on the first interpretation of the experiments discussed 
about according to which the faint perceptual experiences were mistaken for 
visual imagery. 
To give an example, consider a subject in an experiment like that of 
Perky’s discussed above who is asked to imagine a black pentagon. 
Unbeknown to the subject, an image of a white hexagon with a black 
perimeter is projected onto a white wall that the subject is looking at. Plausibly 
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the subject might report having visual imagery as of a grey hexagon (perhaps 
with a black border). Such an experience could plausibly have been had in 
pure perception without any cognitive penetration occurring: the 
straightforward veridical perception of a grey hexagon with a black border. 
Therefore, it seems highly plausible that some hallucinations and dreams 
have the same phenomenology as some visual perceptual experiences. 
In this section, I outlined the idea of cognitive penetration lite and 
provided three reasons to think that, on the assumption that there can be 
cognitive penetration, there is reason to think that cognitive penetration lite 
could exist. I have not tried to establish that cognitive penetration exists. In the 
next section, I examine whether cognitive penetration lite is compatible with 
nonconceptual content. 
 
5. Is Cognitive Penetration Lite Compatible with Nonconceptual 
Content? 
I will consider, in turn, each of the four accounts of nonconceptual content that 
I considered in section three above and whether cognitive penetration lite is 
compatible with each. 
The first account of nonconceptual content was that of Raftopoulos and 
Müller, according to which it is a necessary and sufficient condition for a state 
to have nonconceptual content that is produced by cognitively impenetrable 
mechanisms. Thus a state produced by cognitively penetrable mechanisms 
has conceptual content. Clearly, a state produced by cognitive penetration lite 
cannot have nonconceptual content on this notion of nonconceptual content 
and so cognitive penetration lite is not compatible with this notion of 
nonconceptual content. Note, as I did previously, that this not the standard 
account of nonconceptual content. I will comment further on their motivation 
for holding such an account later in this section. 
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Recall the second account of nonconceptual content posited by 
Bermúdez and Cahen. They hold that that the content of experience is 
nonconceptual to the extent that it is not a function of, or not determined by, 
the concepts of the subject. It is conceptual otherwise. 
Consider an instance of cognitive penetration lite that produces a 
cognitively penetrated experience. On that occasion, the experience is 
produced by cognitive penetration lite and so the experience produced will be 
a function of, and determined by, the subject’s concepts. Those concepts will 
have had a causal role in bringing about the experience with that content and, 
bar pre-emptive causation, a different experience would have occurred. 
However, in general, the existence of that type of experience—the type that 
has the same content and phenomenal character—need not be a function of, 
or need not not determined by, one’s concepts, for that kind of experience 
could have been produced without cognitive penetration coming about. 
Another way of putting the same point is that a token experience may be 
produced by cognitive penetration lite and so the token may be a function of, 
or determined by, the subject’s concepts, but this does not entail that the 
existence of the type of experience—and hence other tokens of that type— 
are a function of, or determined by, a subject’s concepts. (Again, when I talk 
of a type of experience here, and subsequently, I mean to refer to types 
individuated by the fact that they have the same content and phenomenal 
character.) 
This raises the question of which reading Bermúdez and Cahen had in 
mind when stating their definition of conceptual content as occurring when the 
content is a function of, or determined by, the concepts of the subject. There 
is an ambiguity lurking in their specification of conceptual content. Did they 
intend the “on that occasion” reading or did they intend the “in general” 
reading? I will return to answer this question below, but now I will consider 
whether cognitive penetration is compatible with each of the two 
disambiguations. 
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On the “on that occasion” reading of their account, the content of an 
experience produced by cognitive penetration lite will be conceptual. The 
existence of the token experience is a function of, or is determined by, the 
subject’s concepts. On the “in general” reading, the content of an experience 
produced by cognitive penetration lite could be nonconceptual. If cognitive 
penetration produces a token experience of a type, other tokens of which can 
occur by pure perception alone, then while possession of concepts played a 
causal role in the subject coming to have this token experience, there seems 
no reason to think that, in general, coming to have that type of experience 
requires possession of concepts. Indeed, on the assumption that pure 
perceptual experiences do not require concepts in order to have them, then 
the type of experience produced by cognitive penetration lite will not require 
possession of concepts in order to have it either. Thus, on the second 
disambiguation of this view of the distinction between conceptual and 
nonconceptual content, cognitive penetration lite is compatible with 
nonconceptual content. 
The third account of nonconceptual content is the state account, 
according to which an experience has nonconceptual content if and only if in 
order to have an experience with a certain content a subject need not possess 
the concepts required to specify that content. Clearly cognitive penetration lite 
is compatible with this notion of nonconceptual content. As the type of 
experience produced by cognitive penetration lite could occur without 
cognitive penetration occurring, there is no good reason to think that a subject 
need possess certain cognitive states or possess certain concepts in order to 
have an experience with that content. On the assumption that there can be 
pure perceptual experiences that have nonconceptual content, there is no 
reason to suppose that cognitive penetration lite could not produce tokens of 
that type of experience. 
The “in general” reading of the account of nonconceptual content given 
by Bermúdez and Cahen is very similar in spirit to the state account of 
nonconceptual content. The state account is clearly making reference to types 
 33 
of experience and the view is that a type is nonconceptual if tokens of that 
type can exist in a subject without the subject possessing certain concepts, 
just as the “in general” reading of the Bermúdez and Cahen view is the view 
that a type of experience is nonconceptual if the content of some tokens of the 
type of experience need not be a function of, or not determined by, the 
concepts of a subject. Thus we have so far found two, rather similar, views of 
nonconceptual content that are compatible with cognitive penetration lite. 
The fourth account of nonconceptual content is that an experience has 
nonconceptual content if and only if the content of the state does not have 
concepts as constituents. Again, as in the case of classic cognitive 
penetration, the issue of whether experiences have nonconceptual content in 
this sense is orthogonal to whether they are produced by cognitive 
penetration lite. There is no reason why experiences produced by cognitive 
penetration lite should not be nonconceptual in this sense. One could hold 
that such experiences were not composed of concepts but of objects and 
properties, or sets of possible worlds. Thus cognitive penetration lite is 
compatible with the content account of nonconceptual content. 
To summarise the discussion so far in this section, cognitive 
penetration lite has been found to be incompatible with nonconceptual 
content, understood in the manner of the first definition put forward by 
Raftopoulos and Müller. It is incompatible with it on the “on the occasion” 
disambiguation of the second account of nonconceptual content put forward 
by Bermúdez and Cahen. It is compatible with it on the “in general” reading of 
that account of nonconceptual content. It is also compatible with the third 
(state) account and fourth (content) account of nonconceptual content. Thus, 
cognitive penetration lite is compatible with more accounts of nonconceptual 
content than classic cognitive penetration is. Classic cognitive penetration is 
only compatible with the fourth (content) account. 
I now want to examine in more detail the two accounts of 
nonconceptual content with which cognitive penetration lite was found to be 
incompatible. As I twice noted above, the first account of nonconceptual 
 34 
content—that proposed by Raftopoulos and Müller—namely, that it is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a state to have nonconceptual content 
that it is produced by cognitively impenetrable mechanisms, is rather different 
from the other definitions. As I indicated earlier, one might wonder why they 
propose it. 
My suggestion is that their account of nonconceptual content is derived 
from reading the second—Bermúdez and Cahen—definition of nonconceptual 
content on its “on that occasion” disambiguation. Recall that on that 
disambiguation a state has nonconceptual content if and only if the content of 
the state on that occasion—that token state—is a not a function of, or is not 
determined by, the concepts of the subject. What would it be for a token state 
to be that way? It would be for the concepts of the creature not to have a 
causal influence on the bringing about of that state. In other words, it would be 
for the propositional attitudes, occurrent thoughts and judgments, the 
possessing of certain concepts, or the priming of certain concepts, not to have 
an influence on the fact that that state came to exist. It would be for the state 
not to be cognitively penetrated. Thus, this disambiguation of Bermúdez and 
Cahen’s definition is tantamount to saying that a state has nonconceptual 
content if and only if it has not been cognitively penetrated, and it has 
conceptual content if and only if it has been cognitively penetrated. It is not a 
big step to propose, as Raftopoulos and Müller do, that a state has 
nonconceptual content if and only if it has been produced by cognitively 
impenetrable mechanisms, and that a state has conceptual content if and only 
if it has been produced by cognitively penetrable mechanisms. The precise 
way that the relevant mechanisms are subsequently individuated will 
determine whether there are any states that are not in fact penetrated but 
which count as being produced by cognitively penetrable mechanisms, and 
hence count as having conceptual content. What is clear, however, is that on 
this account any state that is cognitively penetrated will have conceptual 
content. 
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Should we accept either the “on that occasion” disambiguation of the 
Bermúdez and Cahen account or the Raftopoulos and Müller account of 
nonconceptual content? Bermúdez and Cahen themselves do not intend the 
“on this occasion” disambiguation of what they say. They explicitly cite Tye’s 
example of the face/vase ambiguous figure, in which he claims top-down 
processing may be, but need not be, involved in the production of one or other 
experiences of the face/vase ambiguous figure, as being a reason to think 
that Raftopoulos and Müller’s account of nonconceptual content should be 
rejected: 
it is consistent with the notion of nonconceptual content that the 
representation in question is in fact produced in what Raftopoulos and Müller 
would call a conceptually mediated way, whereby concepts in the subject's 
possession influence the content of a personal level representation ... That is, 
it does not seem to be a necessary condition on the nonconceptual content of 
representations in general that they be insulated from the propositional 
attitudes (Bermúdez and Cahen 2012, section 4.2) 
This reasoning would also apply to rejection of the “on this occasion” reading 
of their account, thus it would be highly unlikely for them to endorse it. 
 But why should we reject the “on that occasion” disambiguation of the 
Bermúdez and Cahen account and the Raftopoulos and Müller account of 
nonconceptual content, rather than be pluralist, thinking that there are simply 
different accounts of nonconceptual content? If we adopted a pluralist account 
then we could simply say that cognitive penetration lite is incompatible with 
nonconceptual content as it is conceived on the “on that occasion” 
disambiguation of the Bermúdez and Cahen account and the Raftopoulos and 
Müller account, but is compatible with the other accounts of nonconceptual 
content. 
Only Raftopoulos and Müller hold their account and I know no one who 
holds the “on this occasion” disambiguation of Bermúdez and Cahen’s 
account (or have indeed pointed out this ambiguity in it). Raftopoulos and 
Müller, then, are alone in recommending this type of account. It is rather 
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different from all the other accounts because, as we have seen, their account 
of the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction allies it very closely with the issue 
of whether cognitive penetration occurs. In doing so, it bears little relation to 
the concerns that originally motivated the introduction of the notion of 
nonconceptual content into the literature, namely the alleged properties of 
experience, I-VI, mentioned above, which the other accounts are motivated to 
explain. That Raftopoulos and Müller’s account is not concerned with whether 
experience has these properties is brought out by considering cognitive 
penetration lite, which provides us with an example of cognitively penetrated 
states, which according to Raftopoulos and Müller’s account must be 
conceptual states, but which it is plausible to think still have the properties I-VI 
listed above, if any perceptual experiences have them. (Similar reasoning 
applies to the “on that occasion” disambiguation of the Bermúdez and Cahen 
account.) 
Why is it plausible to think that states produced by cognitive 
penetration lite have the properties I-VI, if any perceptual experiences have 
them? Consider them again: 
I. Fineness of grain 
II. Unit-free representation 
III. Analogue representation 
IV. Can be had by young children and animals 
V. Explains the acquisition of concepts 
VI. Can represent contradictions. 
Cognitive penetration lite produces experiences of a type that could have 
been had by pure perception alone, without cognitive penetration occurring. If 
one thinks that pure perceptual experiences possess the above properties (or 
any subset of them), then so too will the other tokens of the same type 
produced by cognitive penetration lite. Even if one thought that only some 
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pure perceptual experiences possess the above properties, I can see no good 
reason to think that cognitive penetration lite will produce only experiences 
that lack those properties. On the contrary, there is every reason to suspect 
that it will produce experiences with those properties. 
Another way to show that it is plausible that experiences produced by 
cognitive penetration lite could have the above properties starts from 
supposing that some cognitive penetration lite occurs by means of the 
mechanism that I outlined in section four, namely, by the processes 
underlying visual imagination, dreaming or hallucination interacting with the 
processes of perception to produce one experience with a phenomenal 
character and content determined by both processes. If experiences are 
produced in such a fashion, then there is good reason to think that some of 
them are likely to have properties I-VI. This is because experiences had in 
visual imagination, dreaming, and hallucination could have the above 
properties if pure perceptual experiences can have them. As I argued above, 
there is reason to think that the phenomenology of some of these experiences 
is the same as some experiences had during pure perception. It is reasonable 
to think that the output of the result of two processes, each of which can alone 
produce experiences with properties I-VI, could be experiences with those 
properties also. And even if no experience had in visual imagination, 
dreaming, or hallucination has the same phenomenology as an experience 
produced by pure perception, the phenomenology of some of these 
experiences seems similar enough to that of experiences produced by pure 
perception that it might be reasonable to attribute enough of properties I-VI to 
them to warrant thinking that their content is nonconceptual. If so, it is 
reasonable to think that the output of the result of two processes, each of 
which can alone produce experiences with nonconceptual content, could be 
experiences that also have nonconceptual content. 
So Raftopoulos and Müller’s account and the “on that occasion” 
disambiguation of the Bermúdez and Cahen account will count experiences 
produced by cognitive penetration lite as having conceptual content, but it is 
 38 
plausible to think that at least some of these experiences will have the 
properties I-VI outlined above, if any perceptual experiences do. So, the two 
accounts will classify as having conceptual content some experiences that 
have the properties that have motivated people to believe that experiences 
have nonconceptual content. This gives one some reason to reject these 
accounts as accounts of nonconceptual content. They don’t track the 
properties of experience that have motivated people to hold that experiences 
have nonconceptual content. They just look like accounts of something else: 
accounts of states that are not cognitively penetrated or not produced by 
mechanisms that can be cognitively penetrated. 
If we reject the idea that Raftopoulos and Müller’s account and the “on 
that occasion” disambiguation of the Bermúdez and Cahen account should be 
accepted as accounts of nonconceptual content, then cognitive penetration 
lite is compatible with all accounts of nonconceptual content. If we are 
pluralists and accept Raftopoulos and Müller’s account and the “on that 
occasion” disambiguation of the Bermúdez and Cahen account as special 
types of accounts of nonconceptual content then, while cognitive penetration 
lite is not compatible with them, it is with all other accounts. Either way, 
cognitive penetration lite is compatible with the main and traditional accounts 
of nonconceptual content. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have distinguished two forms of cognitive penetration: the 
classic model and cognitive penetration lite. I did not argue that cognitive 
penetration occurs, but that if it does occur, there is reason to think that 
cognitive penetration lite could occur. My argument was by means of 
consideration of two examples—the colour cut-out case and Tye’s face/vase 
ambiguous figure case—and on consideration of the indirect mechanism 
involving visual imagery, dreams, or hallucinations that I outlined and showed 
would explain the existence of some cases of cognitive penetration. 
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 I outlined four different accounts of nonconceptual content and showed 
that classic cognitive penetration was only compatible with one: the content 
account of nonconceptual content. I showed that cognitive penetration lite was 
straightforwardly compatible with the two traditional accounts of 
nonconceptual content: the state account and the content account. I then 
showed that there was an ambiguity in Bermúdez and Cahen’s account. One 
disambiguation—the “in general” disambiguation—yielded an account very 
similar in spirit to the state account and an account that is compatible with 
cognitive penetration lite. The other disambiguation—the “on that occasion” 
disambiguation—was very similar to Raftopoulos and Müller’s account. These 
accounts were not compatible with cognitive penetration lite, but I provided 
some reasons to resist accepting these as accounts of nonconceptual 
content. 
 In summary, whether cognitive penetration and nonconceptual content 
are compatible depends on the accounts of each that one is considering. 
However, I demonstrated that there are a good number of forms of cognitive 
penetration and nonconceptual content that are compatible. Thus, if one is 
motivated to hold that experience is nonconceptual, and one is motivated for 
the reasons that experience has at least some of the six properties that have 
traditionally motivated the positing of nonconceptual content, then this should 
not stop one from holding that cognitive penetration, in particular cognitive 
penetration lite, can occur. I outlined an indirect mechanism involving the 
processes underlying visual imagery, dreams or hallucinations—processes 
that uncontroversially can be driven by cognitive states—to explain how there 
could be cases of cognitive penetration lite. This indirect mechanism not only 
explains how cognitive penetration lite could come about, but also explains its 
compatibility with the traditional forms of nonconceptual content.16 
 
 
                                                
16 Enormous thanks are due to Clare Batty and Craig French for reading and 
providing very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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